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Abstract
Machine learning models have been shown to be vulnerable to mem-
bership inference attacks, i.e., inferring whether individuals’ data have
been used for training models. The lack of understanding about factors
contributing success of these attacks motivates the need for modelling
membership information leakage using information theory and for investi-
gating properties of machine learning models and training algorithms that
can reduce membership information leakage. We use conditional mutual
information leakage to measure the amount of information leakage from
the trained machine learning model about the presence of an individual in
the training dataset. We devise an upper bound for this measure of infor-
mation leakage using Kullback–Leibler divergence that is more amenable
to numerical computation. We prove a direct relationship between the
Kullback–Leibler membership information leakage and the probability of
success for a hypothesis-testing adversary examining whether a particular
data record belongs to the training dataset of a machine learning model.
We show that the mutual information leakage is a decreasing function of
the training dataset size and the regularization weight. We also prove
that, if the sensitivity of the machine learning model (defined in terms of
the derivatives of the fitness with respect to model parameters) is high,
more membership information is potentially leaked. This illustrates that
complex models, such as deep neural networks, are more susceptible to
membership inference attacks in comparison to simpler models with fewer
degrees of freedom. We show that the amount of the membership in-
formation leakage is reduced by O(log1/2(δ−1)ǫ−1) when using Gaussian
(ǫ, δ)-differentially-private additive noises.
1 Introduction
In the era of big data, advanced machine learning techniques enable accurate
data analytic for various application domains. This has incentivized commercial
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access to machine learning models by third-party users, e.g., machine learning as
a service provided by data giants, such as Google and Amazon, allows companies
to train models on their data and to sell access to these models. Although
commercially attractive, these services open the door to data theft and privacy
infringements. An example of this is membership inference attack by which an
adversary attempts at inferring whether individuals’ data is used for training a
machine learning model [22].
In this paper, we propose membership information leakage metrics to inves-
tigate the reasons behind the success of membership inference attacks. We use
conditional mutual information leakage to measure the amount of informa-
tion leakage from the trained machine learning model about the presence of an
individual in the training dataset. We find an upper bound for this measure of
information leakage using Kullback–Leibler divergence between the distribution
of the machine learning models in the presence of a particular data record and
in the absence of that data record. Following this, we defineKullback–Leibler
membership information leakage. Using the Le Cam’s inequality [27] and
the Pinsker’s inequality [15], we show that this measure bounds the probabil-
ity of success of any adversary trying to determine if a particular
data record belongs to the training dataset of a machine learning
model. This provides an information-theoretic interpretation for our choices of
membership information leakage metrics.
We use the developed measures of membership information leakage to in-
vestigate factors behind the success of membership inference attacks. We first
prove that the amount of the membership information leakage is a de-
creasing function of the training dataset size. This signifies that, by using
a larger training dataset, the model is less over-fit to the training dataset and
therefore it is harder to distinguish the training data from the rest. This partic-
ular result is applicable to general machine learning models ranging from linear
regression to deep neural networks as it does not require convexity. By focusing
on convex machine learning problems, we investigate other important factors
behind the success of membership inference attacks. We prove that regulariza-
tion reduces the amount of membership information leakage. This can
again be attributed to that increasing the importance of the regularization re-
duces over-fitting and is therefore an important tool for combating membership
inference attacks. Then, we define sensitivity of machine learning models by
bounding variations of the model fitness across all the data entries and model
parameters. Following this, we prove that less membership information is
leaked if the training dataset is more sensitive. This can illustrate that
complex models, such as deep neural networks, are more susceptible to mem-
bership inference attacks in comparison to simpler models with fewer degrees of
freedom.
Finally, we study the effect of additive noise on the success of membership
inference attacks by quantifying the amount of decrease in the membership infor-
mation leakage caused by additive Gaussian noise. We particularly prove that
membership information leakage reduces by O(log1/2(δ−1)ǫ−1) when
using (ǫ, δ)-differentially-private additive Gaussian noises, following the
2
Gaussian mechanism in [6, Theorem A.1].
2 Related Work
Membership inference attacks, a class of adversarial inference algorithms de-
signed to distinguish data used for training a machine learning model, have
recently gained much attention [22, 23, 20, 19]. These attacks have been de-
ployed on various machine learning models; see, e.g., [22, 7, 3, 9, 14, 2]. The
success of the attacks is often attributed to that a machine learning model be-
haves differently on the training dataset and the test dataset, e.g., it shows
higher confidence on the training dataset due to an array of reasons, such as
over-fitting.
Many defence mechanisms have been proposed against membership inference
attacks. A game-theoretic approach is proposed in [16], where a regularization
term using the accuracy of membership inference attacks is incorporated when
training machine learning models. Others have introduced indistinguishability
for membership inference attacks as an estimate of the discrimination of the
model on training and test datasets [25]. Alternatively, it has been suggested
that we can counter membership inference attacks by reducing over-fitting [26].
Membership inference attacks are shown to work better on certain subgroups of
the population, e.g., underrepresented minorities, resulting in disparate vulnera-
bility [25]. Furthermore, success of membership inference attack may not predict
success of attribute inference attacks with only access to partial view of data
records [28]. Another approach is to use differentially-private machine learning
at the cost of significantly reducing the utility [18, 13]. However, none of these
capture the possibly many factors contributing to the success of membership
inference attacks.
This motivates taking a deeper look at the factors behind the success of mem-
bership inference attacks using information-theoretic membership information
leakage metrics. This is the topic of this paper.
3 Membership Information Leakage
Consider all possible data records in a universe U := {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 ⊆ Rpx × Rpy
in which xi and yi denote inputs and outputs, respectively. A machine learning
algorithm only has access to n entries from this data universe. We denote this
by the private training dataset D ⊆ U . Hence, the size of the training dataset
is |D| = n < N . Let (zi)Ni=1 ∈ {0, 1}N be such that zi = 1 if (xi, yi) ∈ D and
zi = 0 otherwise. Let (zi)
N
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}N be uniformly selected at random from
Z := {(zi)Ni=1 ∈ {0, 1}N |
∑N
i=1 zi = n}. This implies that any record in the
data universe U is equally likely to be part of the training dataset D. This is a
common assumption in machine learning [1] and membership inference [20].
Consider a generic supervised machine learning problem with the aim of
training a modelM(·; θ) : Rpx → Rpy to capture the relationship between inputs
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and outputs in the training dataset D by solving the optimization problem in
θ∗ ∈ argmin
θ∈Θ
f(θ,D), (1)
with
f(θ,D) := λg(θ) + 1|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ(M(x; θ), y),
where ℓ(M(x; θ), y) is a loss function capturing the “closeness” of the outcome
of the trained ML model M(x; θ) to the actual output y, g(θ) is a regularizing
term, λ ≥ 0 is a weight balancing between the loss function and the regularizing
term, and Θ ⊆ Rpθ denotes the set of feasible models.
For an arbitrary (xi, yi) ∈ U , an adversary is interested in inferring whether
(xi, yi) belongs to D or not based on the knowledge of (xi, yi) and θ∗. We use
conditional mutual information between θ∗ and zi as a measure of how much
information regarding zi, i.e., whether (xi, yi) belongs to D or not, is leaked
through θ∗.
Definition 1 (Mutual Membership Information Leakage). We measure
membership information leakage in machine learning by
ρMI(θ
∗) :=I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi)
=E
{
log
(
p(θ∗, zi|xi, yi)
p(θ∗|xi, yi)p(zi|xi, yi)
)}
.
The definition of mutual information above uses a mixture of discrete and
continuous random variables which differs from the traditional definition of mu-
tual information relying on either discrete or continuous random variables [4].
We can rewrite the conditional mutual information as
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) =E
{
log
(
p(θ∗, zi|xi, yi)
p(θ∗|xi, yi)p(zi|xi, yi)
)}
=E
{
log
(
p(θ∗|zi, xi, yi)
p(θ∗|xi, yi)
)}
.
where
p(θ∗|xi, yi) =p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi = 0)P{zi = 0}
+ p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi = 1)P{zi = 1}. (2)
In what follows, let p0(θ
∗) = p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi = 0), p1(θ∗) = p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi = 1),
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α0 = P{zi = 0} = n/N , and α1 = P{zi = 1} = 1− α0. Therefore,
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) =E
{
log
(
p(θ∗|zi, xi, yi)
α0p0(θ∗) + α1p1(θ∗)
)}
=E
{
α0 log
(
p0(θ
∗)
α0p0(θ∗) + α1p1(θ∗)
)
+ α1 log
(
p1(θ
∗)
α0p0(θ∗) + α1p1(θ∗)
)}
=E{α0DKL(p0(θ∗)||α0p0(θ∗) + α1p1(θ∗))
+ α1DKL(p1(θ
∗)α0p0(θ
∗) + α1p1(θ
∗))}. (3)
From (3), we can develop an upper bound for I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) based on the convex-
ity of the Kullback–Leibler divergence DKL(p||q) with respect to q. This bound
is easier to numerically compute and is thus used in our numerical evaluations.
Note that
DKL(p0(θ
∗)||α0p0(θ∗) + α1p1(θ∗)) ≤α0DKL(p0(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))
+ α1DKL(p0(θ
∗)||p1(θ∗))
=α1DKL(p0(θ
∗)||p1(θ∗)),
and
DKL(p1(θ
∗)||α0p0(θ∗) + α1p1(θ∗)) ≤α0DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))
+ α1DKL(p1(θ
∗)||p1(θ∗))
=α0DKL(p1(θ
∗)||p0(θ∗)).
These inequalities imply that
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) ≤α0α1E{DKL(p0(θ∗)||p1(θ∗)) +DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))}
≤1
4
E{DKL(p0(θ∗)||p1(θ∗)) +DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))}.
This derivation motivates the introduction of another measure for membership
information leakage in machine learning using the Kullback–Leibler divergence.
Definition 2 (Kullback–Leibler Leakage). The Kullback–Leibler informa-
tion leakage in machine learning is ρKL(θ
∗) := E{DKL(p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi =
1)‖p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi = 0)) +DKL(p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi = 0)‖p(θ∗|xi, yi, zi = 1))}.
We readily get a relationship between ρKL(θ
∗) and ρML(θ
∗). This is ex-
pressed in the next corollary.
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Corollary 1. ρMI(θ
∗) ≤ ρKL(θ∗)/4.
We can relate the Kullback–Leibler information leakage to the ability of an
adversary inferring whether a data point belongs to the training dataset. This
is investigated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Ψxi,yi : R
pθ → {0, 1} denote the policy of the adversary
for determining whether (xi, yi) belongs to the training set based on access
to the trained model θ∗. Then
P{Ψxi,yi(θ∗) = zi} ≤
1
2
√
ρKL(θ∗).
Proof. Using Le Cam’s inequality [27], we get
inf
Ψxi,yi
P{Ψxi,yi(θ∗) 6= zi} = 1− ν(p1(θ∗), p0(θ∗)),
where ν is the total variation distance defined as
ν(ξ1, ξ2) :=
1
2
∫
supp(ξ1)∪supp(ξ2)
|ξ1(x)− ξ2(x)|dx.
Hence,
sup
Ψxi,yi
P{Ψxi,yi(θ∗) = zi}
= sup
Ψxi,yi
[1− P{Ψxi,yi(θ∗) 6= zi}]
= 1− inf
Ψxi,yi
P{Ψxi,yi(θ∗) 6= zi}
= ν(p1(θ
∗), p0(θ
∗)).
Note that
E{ν(p1(θ∗), p0(θ∗))} ≤E
{√
1
2
DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))
}
≤
√√√√1
2
E
{
DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))
}
,
where the first inequality follows from the Pinsker’s inequality [15] and the
second inequality follows from the Jensen’s inequality [4] while noting that x 7→√
x is a concave function. Similarly, we can prove that
E{ν(p1(θ∗), p0(θ∗))} ≤
√√√√1
2
E
{
DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))
}
.
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Combining these two inequalities results in
E{ν(p1(θ∗), p0(θ∗))}2≤1
2
E{min{DKL(p0(θ∗)||p1(θ∗)), DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))}}.
The rest of the proof follows from that
min{DKL(p0(θ∗)||p1(θ∗)),DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗))}
≤ (DKL(p0(θ∗)||p1(θ∗)) +DKL(p1(θ∗)||p0(θ∗)))/2.
This concludes the proof.
Remark 1 (Black-box vs. White-box). In both definitions of the membership
information leakage, we assume that the adversary has access to the parame-
ters of the trained model θ∗ (i.e., white-box assumption). This is the strongest
assumption for an adversary and the amount of the leaked information reduces
if we instead let the adversary query the model (i.e., black-box assumption).
In fact, the data processing inequality states that I(M(xi; θ
∗), yi; zi|xi, yi) ≤
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) = ρMI(θ∗). We are interested in analyzing this framework as
it provides an insight against the worst-case adversary and therefore the mit-
igation techniques extracted from this analysis would also work against weaker
adversaries with more restricted access to the model.
Remark 2 (Gaussian Approximation for Numerical Evaluation). Let us present
a simple numerical method for computing Kullback–Leibler information leakage
using Gaussian approximation. To this aim, we can approximate p1(θ
∗) and
p0(θ
∗) by Gaussian density functions N (µxi,yi1 ,Σxi,yi1 ) and N (µxi,yi0 ,Σxi,yi0 ), re-
spectively. Doing so, we get
̺1(xi, yi):=DKL(p1(θ
∗)||p0(θ∗))
=0.5(trace((Σxi,yi0 )
−1Σxi,yi0 )− pθ
+(µxi,yi0 −µxi,yi1 )(Σxi,yi0 )−1(µxi,yi0 −µxi,yi1 )
+ln(det(Σxi,yi0 )/ det(Σ
xi,yi
1 ))).
We can similarly evaluate the value of ̺2(xi, yi) := DKL(p0(θ
∗)||p1(θ∗)). Then,
we can approximate ρKL(θ
∗) by computing ̺1(xi, yi) and ̺2(xi, yi) for a set of
data entries J ⊆ U and compute
ρKL(θ
∗) ≈ 1|J |
∑
(x,y)∈J
(̺1(x, y) + ̺2(x, y)).
This enables us to approximately compute the KullbackLeibler information leak-
age in machine learning. Interestingly, this is an approximation method for
computing ρMI(θ
∗) when approximating p1(θ
∗) and p0(θ
∗) by Gaussian density
functions [8]. This is because, under Gaussian approximation, p(θ∗|xi, yi) fol-
lows a Gaussian mixture.
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4 What Influences Membership Inference?
One of the most important factors in machine learning is the size of the training
dataset. In what follows, we show that the success of the membership inference
attack is inversely proportional to the size of the training dataset.
Theorem 2. Assume that
(A1) Θ is compact;
(A2) {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 is i.i.d. following distribution P;
(A3) λg(θ)+EP{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} is continuous and has a unique minimizer;
(A4) ℓ(M(x; θ), y) is almost surely Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz con-
stant L(x, y) on Θ with respect to P and EP{L(x, y)} <∞.
Then, lim
n,N→∞:n≤N
ρMI(θ
∗) = 0.
Proof. Using Proposition 8.5 in [10], (A1), (A2) and (A4) ensures that f(θ;D)
converges to λg(θ) +EP{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} almost surely uniformly on Θ as n ≤ N
tends to infinity. Following this observation in conjunction with (A1), (A3)
and Theorem 8.2 in [10], we get that θ∗ converges to θ′ ∈ argminθ∈Θ λg(θ) +
EP{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} almost surely. Almost sure convergence implies convergence
in probability and that in turn implies convergence in distribution [11, p. 38].
Now, the upper semi-continuity of the entropy [17] ensures that
lim sup
n,N→∞:n≤N
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) ≤ lim sup
n,N→∞:n≤N
H(θ∗|xi, yi)
≤ H(θ′|xi, yi),
where the first inequality follows from that
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) = H(θ∗|xi, yi)−H(θ∗|xi, yi, zi)
≤ H(θ∗|xi, yi).
Therefore,
0 ≤ lim inf
n,N→∞:n≤N
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi)
≤ lim sup
n,N→∞:n≤N
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) ≤ H(θ′|xi, yi) = 0,
where the last equality follows from that θ′ is deterministic. Therefore, the limit
limn,N→∞:n≤N I(θ
∗; zi|xi, yi) exists and is equal to zero.
Theorem 2 states that the amount of the membership information
leakage is a decreasing function of the size of the training dataset.
This shows that, by using a larger training dataset, the model is less over-fit to
the training dataset and it is therefore harder to distinguish the training data.
This is in-line with the observation that over-fitting contributes to success of
membership inference attacks [26]. The result of Theorem 2 does not require
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convexity of the loss function or even its differentiability. Therefore, it is appli-
cable to different machine learning models ranging from linear regression and
support vector machines to neural networks and decision trees. In the next the-
orem, by focusing on convex smooth machine learning problems, we investigate
the effect of other factors, such as regularization, on the success of membership
inference attacks.
Theorem 3. Assume that
(A1) Θ is compact;
(A2) {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 is i.i.d. following distribution P;
(A3) λg(θ) + EP{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} is continuous, finite everywhere, and has
a unique minimizer;
(A4) ℓ(M(x; θ), y) is almost surely Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz con-
stant L on Θ;
(A5) g(θ) is κ-strongly convex and E{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} is convex.
Then,
ρMI(θ
∗) ≤pθ log(2πe) + pθ log
(√
2L diam(Θ)√
epθ
√
cNκλ
)
.
Proof. Using (5.126) in [21], there exists c > 0 such that
P{f¯(θ∗)− f¯(θ′) ≤ ǫ} ≥ 1− exp
(
−c Nǫ
2
L2 diam(Θ)2
)
,
where f¯(θ) := λg(θ) + E{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} and, similar to the proof of Theorem 2,
θ′ ∈ argminθ∈Θ f¯(θ). For κ-strongly convex function g, which also implies that
f¯ is κλ-strongly convex, we have
f¯(θ′) ≤ f¯(tθ∗ + (1− t)θ′)
≤ tf¯(θ∗) + (1− t)f¯(θ′)− κλ
2
t(t− 1)‖θ′ − θ∗‖22,
for all t ∈ (0, 1). Setting t = 1/2 in this inequality results in ‖θ′ − θ∗‖22 ≤
4(f¯(θ∗)− f¯(θ′))/(κλ). Thus,
P
{
‖θ′ − θ∗‖22 ≤
4ǫ
κλ
}
≥ 1− exp
(
− cNǫ
2
L2 diam(Θ)2
)
.
This implies that
P
{
‖θ′ − θ∗‖2 ≤ ε
}
≥ 1− exp
(
− cNκ
2λ2ε4
16L2 diam(Θ)2
)
.
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We can thus bound the variance of the model θ∗ by
trace(E{(θ′ − θ∗)(θ′ − θ∗)⊤}) =E{‖θ′ − θ∗‖22}
=
∫ ∞
0
P{‖θ′ − θ∗‖22 ≥ t}dt
=
∫ ∞
0
P{‖θ′ − θ∗‖2 ≥
√
t}dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− cNκ
2λ2t2
16L2 diam(Θ)2
)
dt
=
2
√
πL diam(Θ)√
cNκλ
Define Z := E{(θ′−θ∗)(θ′−θ∗)⊤}. From Theorem 8.6.5 in [4], we have H(θ∗) ≤
pθ
2 log(2πe) + log(det(Z)). On the other hand, note that
log(det(Z)) ≤ max
Z′≥0
log(det(Z ′)),
s.t. trace(Z ′) ≤ 2
√
πL diam(Θ)√
cNκλ
,
and, as a result,
log(det(Z)) ≤ pθ log
(
2
√
πL diam(Θ)
pθ
√
cNκλ
)
.
Thus,
H(θ∗) ≤ pθ
2
log(2πe) + pθ log
(
2
√
πL diam(Θ)
pθ
√
cNκλ
)
.
The rest of the proof follows from that
I(θ∗; zi|xi, yi) = H(θ∗|xi, yi)−H(θ∗|xi, yi, zi) ≤ H(θ∗),
because conditioning reduces entropy [4, Theorem 17.1.4].
Theorem 3 shows that regularization reduces the amount of member-
ship information leakage. Increasing the importance of the regularization
reduces the over-fitting and is therefore an important tool for combating mem-
bership inference attacks. Let us define model sensitivity by
S := sup
(x,y)
sup
θ
∥∥∥∥∂ℓ(M(x; θ), y)∂θ
∥∥∥∥ .
Clearly, L ≤ S. Therefore, Theorem 3 shows that, if the model sensitivity
is high, more membership information is potentially leaked. Therefore,
complex models, such as deep neural networks, are more susceptible to mem-
bership inference attacks in comparison to simpler models with fewer degrees of
freedom.
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5 Additive Noise for Membership Privacy
In this section, we explore the use of additive noise, particularly, differential
privacy noise, on the amount of the leaked membership information.
Theorem 4. Assume w is a zero-mean Gaussian variable with unit vari-
ance. The mutual membership information leakage is ρMI(θ
∗ + tw) and
KullbackLeibler membership information leakage ρKL(θ
∗ + tw) are decreas-
ing functions of t. Particularly, there exist positive constants cMI > 0 and
cKL > 0 such that ρMI(θ
∗ + tw) = ρMI(θ
∗) − O(t) and ρKL(θ∗ + tw) =
ρKL(θ
∗)−O(t).
Proof. Using de Bruijn Identity in Terms of Divergences [24], we get
dDKL(p1(θ
∗ + tw)‖p0(θ∗ + tw))
dt
=−J(p1(θ
∗ + tw)‖p0(θ∗ + tw))
2
,
where J(p1(θ
∗ + tw)‖p0(θ∗ + tw)) is the Fisher divergence defined as
J(p1(θ
∗ + tw)‖p0(θ∗ + tw)) =
∫ [
∇t log
(
p1(θ
∗ + tw)
p0(θ∗ + tw)
)]⊤
×
[
∇t log
(
p1(θ
∗ + tw)
p0(θ∗ + tw)
)]
p0(θ
∗ + tw)dθ∗.
Note that, by construct, J is semi-positive definite. Note that DKL(p1(θ
∗ +
tw)‖p0(θ∗ + tw)) = −c′t+O(t2), and DKL(p0(θ∗ + tw)‖p1(θ∗ + tw)) = −c′′t +
O(t2), where c′ = (1/2)J(p1(θ∗+tw)‖p0(θ∗+tw))|t=0 ≥ 0 and c′′ = (1/2)J(p0(θ∗+
tw)‖p1(θ∗+ tw))|t=0|t=0 ≥ 0. Selecting cKL = c′+c′′ concludes the proof for the
mutual information by proving that ρKL(θ
∗+ tw) = ρKL(θ
∗)− cKLt+O(t2). In
light of (3), the proof for the mutual membership information leakage follows
the same line of reasoning.
Theorem 4 proves that the amount of membership information leak-
age is increased by reducing the amount of the additive noise. This is
why differential privacy works as a successful defence strategy in membership in-
ference [22], albeit if its privacy budget is set small enough. In what follows, we
focus on the effect of differential privacy noise on the membership information
leakage.
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy). Mechanism θ∗ + w with additive noise w
is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if, for all Lebesgue-measurable sets W ⊆ Rpθ ,
P{θ∗ + w ∈W|(zi)N1 } ≤ exp(ǫ)P{θ∗ + w ∈ W|(z′i)N1 }+ δ,
where (zi)
N
1 and (z
′
i)
N
1 are any two vectors in {0, 1}N such that
∑N
i=1 zi = n,∑N
i=1 z
′
i = n, and there exists at most one index j for which zj 6= z′j.
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Figure 1: The relationship between adversary’s advantage in membership attack
and the size of the training dataset for linear regression (λ = 0 and px = 5).
It has been proved that we can ensure (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with Gaus-
sian noise. This is recited in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that ∆θ∗ > 0 is such that |θ∗((zi)N1 ) − θ∗((z′i)N1 )| ≤
∆θ∗, where (zi)
N
1 and (z
′
i)
N
1 are any two vectors in {0, 1}N such that
∑N
i=1 zi =
n,
∑N
i=1 z
′
i = n, and there exists at most one index j for which zj 6= z′j. Then,
the mechanism θ∗+w is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if w is a zero-mean Gaussian
noise with standard deviation σ =
√
2 log(1.25/δ)∆θ∗/ǫ.
Proof. See [6, Theorem A.1].
Corollary 2. Assume that w is selected to ensure (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
based on Proposition 1. Then, ρMI(θ
∗ + w) = ρMI(θ
∗)−O(log1/2(δ−1)ǫ−1)
and ρKL(θ
∗ + w) = ρKL(θ
∗)−O(log1/2(δ−1)ǫ−1).
6 Experimental Validation
In this section, we demonstrate the results of the paper numerically using a
practical dataset.
6.1 Dataset Description
We use the Adult Dataset available from the UCI Machine Learning Reposi-
tory [5]. This dataset was first used in [12]. The Adult Dataset contains 14
individual attributes, such as age, race, occupation, and relationship status,
as inputs and income level (i.e., above or below $50K per annum) as output.
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Figure 2: The relationship between adversary’s advantage in membership attack
versus the size of the training dataset for neural network (λ = 0 and px = 5).
The dataset contains N = 48, 842 instances extracted from the 1994 Census
database. We translate all categorical attributes and outputs to integers. We
perform feature selection using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
select the top px important features. This greatly improves the numerical sta-
bility of the underlying machine learning algorithms. In what follows, we select
px = 5 except for one example in which we vary px to study its effect on the
success of membership inference and membership information leakage.
6.2 Experiment Setup
We use linear regression to demonstrate all the results of the paper, namely,
Theorems 2–4. However, noting that the results of Theorem 2 also hold for non-
convex learning problems, we demonstrate these results also for neural networks
with five hidden layers with fifty neurons in each layer and hyperbolic tangent
sigmoid activation function. We employ the quadratic regularization function
g(θ) = θ⊤θ if one is used.
For membership inference, we use the threshold-based adversary in [26]. To
assess the effectiveness of the membership attacks, we also use the membership
experiment from [26]. Let us describe this experiment briefly. For any n, we
select (zi)
N
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}N uniformly at random such that
∑N
i=1 zi = n. We train
a model θ∗ based on the training dataset D = {(xi, yi)}i:zi=1. We select b with
equal probability from {0, 1}. Then, we select a single record from the training
dataset D = {(xi, yi)}i:zi=1 if b = 1 or from the remaining data the training
dataset U \D = {(xi, yi)}i:zi=0 if b = 0. We transmit the selected record to the
adversary. The adversary estimates the realization of random variable b, denoted
by bˆ ∈ {0, 1}, based on the selected record and trained model. The adversary’s
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Figure 3: The relationship between adversary’s advantage in membership attack
and regularization weight λ for linear regression (n = 10 and px = 5).
advantage (in comparison to randomly selecting an estimate) is given by
Adv := |2P{bˆ = b} − 1|.
We investigate the relationship between this advantage and other factors, such
as membership information leakage, training dataset size, regularization, and
additive privacy-preserving noise, in the remainder of this section.
6.3 Experimental Results
We first show that the membership information leakage gets smaller by increas-
ing the size of the training dataset; thus validating the prediction of Theorem 2.
Figure 1 illustrates the adversary’s advantage in membership attack (left axis)
and the membership information leakage (right axis) versus the size of the train-
ing dataset in the case of linear regression. The box plot shows the adversary’s
advantage and the solid line shows the membership information leakage. As
expected from the theorem, the adversary’s advantage in membership attack
and the membership information leakage decrease rapidly by increasing the size
of the training dataset. Noting that the results of Theorem 2 also hold for non-
convex learning problems, we demonstrate this results also for neural networks.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between adversary’s advantage in member-
ship attack and the size of the training dataset for a neural network with five
hidden layers with fifty neurons in each layer and hyperbolic tangent sigmoid
activation function. The same trend is also visible in this case.
Now, we proceed to validate the prediction of Theorem 3 regarding the effect
of regularization. Figure 3 shows the adversary’s advantage in membership
attack (left axis) and the membership information leakage (right axis) versus
the regularization weight λ for linear regression. Evidently, by increasing the
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Figure 4: The relationship between adversary’s advantage in membership attack
versus number of features px for linear regression (n = 10 and λ = 10
−6).
weight of regularization, the adversary’s advantage in membership attack and
the membership information leakage both decrease. This is intuitive as we
expect, by increasing λ, the trained model to become closer to argminθ∈Θ g(θ)
which is data independent.
An important factor in membership inference success is the number of fea-
tures. Figure 4 illustrates the adversary’s advantage in membership attack (left
axis) and the membership information leakage (right axis) versus the number of
the features extracted from the PCA px for linear regression. Now, by increas-
ing the the number of the features, the adversary’s advantage in membership
attack and the membership information leakage both increase (as more features
potentially makes the data entries more unique and their effect of the trained
model more pronounced).
Finally, we investigate the effect of the additive noise on membership in-
ference. Figure 5 shows the adversary’s advantage in membership attack (left
axis) and the membership information leakage (right axis) versus the standard
deviation of the additive noise to the model parameters for linear regression. By
increasing the magnitude of the noise, the adversary’s advantage in membership
attack and the membership information leakage both decrease. This is in-line
with our theoretical observations from Theorem 4.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We used mutual information and Kullback–Leibler divergence to develop mea-
sures for membership information leakage in machine learning. We showed that
the amount of the membership information leakage is a decreasing function of
the training dataset size, the regularization weight, the sensitivity of machine
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Figure 5: The relationship between adversary’s advantage in membership attack
and the standard deviation of additive noise σ for linear regression (n = 30,
λ = 0, and px = 5).
learning model. We also investigated the effect of privacy-preserving additive
noise on membership information leakage and the success of membership infer-
ence attacks. Future work can focus on further experimental validation of the
relationship between the membership information leakage and the success of
membership inference attacks for more general machine learning models, e.g.,
deep neural networks. Another interesting avenue for future research is to use
the developed measures of membership information leakage as a regularizer for
training machine learning models in order to effectively combat membership
inference attacks.
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